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CHAPTER 11 
Torts 
PETER A. DONOV AN* 
§ 11.1. Liability for Sale of Alcoholic Beverages. Two cases during the 
Survey year further considered the liability of a seller of alcholic bever-
ages for injuries caused by a patron who is either intoxicated or a minor. 
In Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 1 a tavern keeper sold alcoholic beverages 
to an intoxicated patron who subsequently caused the death of the plain-
tiff's son while operating a motor vehicle. Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon 
Liquors, Inc., 2 reviewed similar issues in the context of a package store's 
liability where it sold a six-pack of beer to a minor. Both decisions follow 
the recent trend holding that the sale of alcoholic beverages to an intox-
icated individual or to a minor may make the seller liable to a third person 
injured in a later automobile collision with the intoxicated or minor 
patron. 
General Laws, chapter 138, section 69 forbids the sale of alcoholic 
beverages to intoxicated persons. 3 General Laws, chapter 138, section 34 
similarly forbids such sales to minors.4 As previously interpreted in Ada-
mian v. Three Sons, Inc.,s section 69 and section 34 impose a duty on 
tavern keepers to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to persons they know, 
or reasonably should know, are intoxicated or minors.6 Both provisions 
were enacted with the purpose of protecting not only the drinker himself, 
but members ofthe general public as well.7 This is particularly relevant in 
* PETER A. DONOVAN is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. The 
author greatly and respectfully acknowledges the research and writing assistance provided 
by Amy Warner in the preparation of this chapter. 
§ Il.l. 1 385 Mass. 323, 431 N .E.2d 920 (1982). 
2 14 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 440 N.E.2d 1297 (1983). 
3 G.L. c. 138, § 69, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 287, provides in part: "No alcoholic 
beverage shall be sold or delivered on any premises licensed under this chapter ... to an 
intoxicated person .... " 
4 G.L. c. 138, § 34, as amended by Acts of 1%2, c. 354, provides in part: " ... whoever 
makes a sale or delivery of [alcoholic) beverages ... to any person under twenty one years 
of age ... shall be punished .... " 
5 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968). See also Diamond v. Sacilotto, 353 Mass. 501, 233 
N.E.2d 20 (1%8). 
6 Violation of G. L. c. 138, §§ 69 and 34 is evidence of negligence. The plaintiff must still 
prove (I) that the defendant, breached a duty owed to the plaintiff; and (2) that this breach 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 
498, 500, 233 N .E.2d 18, 19 (1968). 
7 Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 500, 233 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1968). 
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light of modern reality that travel by car to and from taverns is com-
monplace and accidents resulting from drunk driving are frequent. 8 
Cimino resolves the important issue whether the liquor seller will be 
held to have knowledge that a particular partron was using an automobile. 
Prior to Cimino, there was some doubt how this issue would be decided. 9 
In dealing with the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court in Adamian 10 
warned that: "Henceforth in this Commonwealth waste of human life due 
to drunken driving on the highways will not be left outside the scope ofthe 
foreseeable risk created by the sale of liquor to an already intoxicated 
individual."ll The Court found that the liquor seller involved in Adamian 
knew, or should have known, that the inebriated customer had arrived at 
the restaurant by automobile and, upon leaving, would drive home. On 
the same day, however the Court sustained a directed verdict for a 
defendant seller in Diamond v. Sacilotto,12 a case involving the sale of 
alcohol to minors who admittedly "felt the alcohol." Evidence that there 
was a town owned parking lot which patrons of the barroom could use 
was held insufficient in Diamond to show what the barroom owner knew 
or should have known that the patron was using an automobile.13 
Cimino expressly rejects Diamond to the extent that Diamond' 'implies 
a necessity that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew or should 
have known that a particular intoxicated patron would use a motor vehi-
cle .... "14 Such a requirement, the Cimino Court said, "flies in the face 
of the realities of modern life." 15 Under Cimino, the plaintiff is aided by 
important inferences: "A jury may infer that a tavern keeper of ordinary 
caution recognizes that an intoxicated patron may drive an automobile, 
thus creating a risk of injury to highway travelers, and that such a 
person's response to the recognition ought to be to refrain from serving 
liquor to that patron." 16 
Despite the Cimino inferences, the plaintiff still has to establish a causal 
connection between the sale and the accident. The Court explained the 
"jury may also infer that service of liquor to an intoxicated patron is the 
proximate cause of injuries sustained by a traveler who suffers direct 
injury by reason of a vehicle being operated by the patron in a manner that 
8 Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 453-54, 245 N .E.2d 420, 423 
(1%9). 
9 See Donovan, Torts, 1968 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 3.5, at 54. 
10 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
II 353 Mass. 498, 501, 233 N.E.2d 18,20 (1%8). 
12 353 Mass. 501, 233 N.E.2d 20 (1968). See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
t3 ld. at 502, 233 N.E.2d at 21. 
14 385 Mass. at 330, 431 N.E.2d at 926. 
IS ld. 
16 385 Mass. at 331, 431 N.E.2d at 926. The Court also noted that although he may do so, 
it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant solicited the motoring public, or 
that many of the patrons were drivers. ld. 
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is affected by his intoxication." 17 The failure to establish this causal 
connection between the illegal sale and the resultant accident served as 
the basis for a directed verdict in favor of a liquor seller in Wiska v. 
St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc. 18 despite the sale of liquor to a minor in 
violation of section 34. The only evidence in the Wiska record was that the 
minor was driving "normally" or "driving all right" at the time of the 
accident.19 According to the Appeals Court in Wiska, it was "essential" 
to plaintiff's recovery that "it ... be shown that the minor's negligent 
motor vehicle operation was due to the influence of alcohol affecting his 
ability to drive. "20 
In Michnik-Zilberman, the Appeals Court held that there is "no distinc-
tion between tavern keepers and retail sellers of alcoholic beverages 
which would require 'the court to take the question of foreseeability from 
the jury when the forbidden sale is by a retail seller. "21 The significance of 
this equation can be appreciated when one considered the fact that the 
package store has no control over the buyer's consumption as does the 
tavern keeper. The court reasoned: "In claiming that a distinction exists 
by reason of the fact that a retail seller, unlike a tavern keeper, has no 
control over the consumption of the liquor, [the defendant] forgets that it 
is the sale rather than the consumption which may be found to constitute 
the negligent act."22 Thus, the package store owner's sale of alcoholic 
beverages to a patron who he knows, or reasonably should know, is either 
intoxicated or a minor can be found by ajury to be the proximate cause of 
injuries to a third person injured by a vehicle subsequently operated 
improperly by the patron due to his intoxication. 
Michnik-Zilberman is also the first Massachusetts case to hold that a 
sale to a sober minor can be found the proximate cause of a later accident. 
In other words, a seller of alcoholic beverages could be liable for injuries 
caused by a minor patron regardless of whether the minor was sober or 
inebriated at the time he made the purchase. Liability under the Cimino 
inferences is predicated upon a sale of alcoholic beverages to an already 
intoxicated person, a factor absent in Michnik-Zilberman. Despite the 
sobriety of the minor at the time of purchase in Michnik-Zilberman, the 
appeals Court "refused to conclude that in the face of public concern over 
the fact minors drink while driving, ajury may not infer that a retail seller 
of ordinary caution recognizes that a minor may consume the forbidden 
17 ld. This position was reiterated in a footnote where the court specified eight specific 
requirements for recovery. Jd. at 331 n.9, 431 N.E.2d at 926 n.9. 
18 7 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 390 N.E.2d 1133 (1979). 
19 Jd. at 816, 390 N.E.2d at 1136. 
20 Jd. at 817, 390 N.E.2d at 1136. 
21 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 539, 440 N.E.2d at 1297. 
22 Jd. at 539, 440 N.E.2d at 1301. 
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alcohol and drive before reaching some zone of adult supervision. "23 
Michnik-Zilberman seems to suggest that the retail seller of alcoholic 
beverages who sells to a sober person he knows or should know is a minor 
becomes an insurer covering harm subsequently caused by that minor.24 
§ 11.2 Medical Malpractice Tribunal - Admissibility of Tribunal's 
Decision. During the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court addressed 
several issues relating to the tribunal process established by General 
Laws, chapter 231, section 60B for medical malpractice actions.! The first 
paragraph of section 60B provides that the medical malpractice plaintiff, 
as a condition of suit, "shall present an offer of proof" before a medical 
malpractice tribunal which "shall determine" whether "the evidence 
presented if properly substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate ques-
tion of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry or whether the plaintiff's 
case is merely an unfortunate medical result". 2 If the tribunal "deter-
mines" that the offer of proof is satisfactory, the plaintiff is permitted to 
proceed with his lawsuit without posting the bond required of plaintiffs 
whose offers are "determined" to be inadequate. 3 Paragraph five of the 
statute provides, inter alia, that "[t]he tribunal may upon the application 
of either party or on its own decision ... appoint an ... expert to conduct 
any necessary professional or expert examination of the claimant or 
relevant evidentiary matter and to report or to testify as a witness thereto 
.... The testimony of said witness and the decision of the tribunal shall 
be admissible as evidence at a trial."4 
The Supreme Judicial Court had to determine the relationship of these 
provisions for the first time in Beeler v. Downey. 5 The trial court had 
23 /d. at 540, 440 N .E.2d at 1302. 
24 See Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420 (1%9); c:f: 
Donovan, Torts, 1969 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 1.8., at 16-18. 
§ 11.2. 1 See, e.g., Beeler v. Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 442 N.E.2d 19 (1982); Lubanes v. 
George, 386 Mass. 320, 435 N.E.2d 1031 (1982). 
2 G.L. c. 231, § 60B. 
3 If a finding is made for the defendant the plaintiff may pursue the claim through the 
usual judicial process only upon filing bond in the amount of two thousand dollars 
secured by cash or its equivalent with the clerk of the court in which the case is 
pending, payable to the defendant for costs assessed, including witness and experts 
fees and attorneys fees if the plaintiff does not prevail in the final judgment. Said 
single justice may, within his discretion, increase the amount of the bond required to 
be filed. If said bond is not posted within thirty days of the tribunal's finding the action 
shall be dismissed. Upon motion filed by the plaintiff, and a determination by the 
court that the plaintiff is indigent said justice may reduce the amount of the bond but 
may not eliminate the requirement thereof. 
G.L. c. 231, § 60B. 
4 /d. (emphasis supplied). 
5 387 Mass. 609,4,+2 N.E.2d 19 (1982) 
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excluded from evidence the tribunal's "determination" that the plaintiff's 
offer of proof was sufficient to raise a question of liability appropriate for 
judicial inquiry. The trial judge believed that section 60B was unconstitu-
tional insofar as it required the admission into evidence of such "determi-
nation. "6 The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court on 
different grounds. 7 
In Beeler, the trial judge construed section 60B to require that the 
"determination" ofthe tribunal as to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's offer 
of proof must be admitted at trial.s Based on this interpretation, the trial 
judge held that section 60B violated the due process clause by requiring 
the admission of a decision which was based on evidence not subject to 
cross examination.9 Following the principle that a reviewing court "must 
presume a statute's validity, and make all rational inferences in favor of 
it,"IO the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted section 60B in a manner 
which avoided ruling on its constitutionality. The Court construed the 
word "decision," used for the first time in the fifth paragraph of the 
statute, to refer, not to the tribunal's "determination" as to the suf-
ficiency of the plaintiff's offer of proof, but to the decision of the tri-
bunal to appoint an impartial expert witness. II The Court found support 
for this conclusion in "the critical last sentence of the paragraph which 
refers both to the testimony of the expert appointed by the tribunal and 
the decision of the panel to appoint him."12 Under this construction, the 
statute remained constitutional throughout. Under Beeler, "[o]nly the 
decision of the tribunal to call an expert, and the testimony of the expert 
before the tribunal, would be admissible, and both parties would have had 
an opportunity to question and cross-examine the expert before the tri-
bunal. "13 
6 Id. at 610, 442 N.E. 2d at 20. 
7 Id. at 610, 442 N.E.2d at 20. 
K The trial judge concluded that the words "determination" and "decision," found in the 
first and fifth paragraphs of section 60B, refer to the "finding" that no bond was required of 
plaintiff because the offer of proof was "sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability 
appropriate for judicial inquiry." 387 Mass. at 612; 442 N.E.2d at 21. 
9 The tribunal's evaluation of the offer of proof is comparable to that of a trial judge ruling 
on a defendant's motion for directed verdict. Little v. Rosenthal, 376 Mass. 573, 578, 382 
N.E. 2d 1037, 1040-41 (1978); see also Kapp v. Ballantine, 380 Mass. 186,402 N.E.2d 463 
(1980). . 
10 387 Mass. at 615-16, 442 N.E.2d at 22-23 (quoting Paro v. Longwood Hospital, 363 
Mass. 645, 650, 369, N.E.2d 985, 990 (1977». 
II 387 Mass. at 618, 442 N.E.2d at 23. The Court determined that the decision of the 
tribunal to appoint the expert was relevant because the jury would be able to evaluate his 
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§ 11.3. Medical Malpractice Tribunal - Scope of Coverage. Under 
General Laws, chapter 231, section 60B, the medical malpractice tribunal 
has jurisdiction over "[e]very action for malpractjce, error or mistake." 1 
In Lubanes v. George,2 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a claim 
against a physician alleging that he performed a surgical procedure on the 
plaintiff without the plaintiff's consent, or contrary to plaintiff's express 
instructions, is subject to section 60B and the tribunal procedure even 
though the claim sounds in battery. 3 The Court followed its interpretation 
in Little v. Rosenthal4 that "all treatment-related claims were meant to be 
referred to a malpractice tribunal."5 Previously, the Court applied this 
same interpretation to actions for breach of contract to produce a particu-
lar medical result. 6 In concluding that unauthorized surgery is covered by 
the tribunal process, the Court in Lubanes reasoned that it "is as much a 
form of malpractice as is the failure to produce a promised medical 
result."7 As such, unauthorized surgery fell within the Court's earlier 
pronouncement that "the policy embodied in section 60B of discouraging 
frivolous claims against physicians would be furthered by including such 
actions within its scope."8 
The plaintiff's burden in making a suitable offer of proof in an unau-
thorized surgery case seems easily met. By affidavit and unspecified other 
documents, the plaintiff in Lubanes claimed he consented only to the 
removal of his toenail. The defendant however, performed an additional 
surgical procedure, a subungual exostectomy, on the point of the plain-
tiff's toe. Although the consent form listed "Halix nail removal" and 
"subungual exostosis" as the procedures to be performed, the plaintiff 
claimed that the latter procedure was not on the consent form when he 
signed it. 9 The Court willingly accepted the plaintiff's affidavit. 1 0 
§ 1\.3. 1 G. L. c. 231, § 60B provides in part: "Every action for malpractice, error or 
mistake against a provider of health care shall be heard by a tribunal ... at which hearing the 
plaintiff shall present an offer of proof and said tribunal shall determine if the evidence 
presented if properly substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability 
appropriate for judicial inquiry or whether the plaintiff's case is merely an unfortunate 
medical result. ... Substantial evidence shall mean such evidence as a reasonable person 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion ... '. If a finding is made for the defendant 
the plaintiff may pursue the claim through the usual judicial process only upon filing bond in 
the amount of two thousand dollars .... " 
2386 Mass. 320, 435 N.E.2d 1031 (1982). 
3 /d. at 325, 435 N .E.2d at 1034. 
4 376 Mass. 573, 382 N .E.2d 1037 (1978). 
5 /d. at 576, 382 N .E.2d at 1040. 
6 Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Quinn, 377 Mass. 514, 386 N.E.2d 1268 (1979). 
7 386 Mass. at 324,435 N.E.2d at 1034. 
• Id. at 324, 435 N .E. 2d at 1034. 
9 /d. at 323, N .E.2d at 1035. 
10 /d. at 326, N.E.2d at 1035. 
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§ 11.4. Medical Malpractice - Informed Consent In the important 
decision of Harnish v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court addressed the issue of what medical information a physi-
cian must disclose to his patient under the informed consent doctrine. The 
purpose of this doctrine is to enable a patient to make an informed 
judgment whether to give or withhold consent to a medical or surgical 
procedure. Consent given by a patient pursuant to inadequate disclosure 
of medical information will not insulate medical personnel from a subse-
quent claim of unauthorized treatment. The Harnish Court clearly defined 
the scope of disclosure required in Massachusetts under the informed 
consent doctrine. 
According to the offer of proof in Harnish, the plaintiff underwent an 
operation to remove a tumor in her neck. 2 During the procedure, her 
hypoglossal nerve was severed, allegedly resulting in a permanent and 
almost total loss of tongue function. 3 The plaintiff claimed the physicians 
and the hospital were negligent in failing to inform her before surgery of 
the risk of loss of tongue function. 4 She alleged that the purpose of the 
operation was cosmetic, that the loss of tongue function was a material 
and foreseeable risk of the operation, and that had she been informed of 
this risk, she would not have consensted to the operation.s The medical 
malpractice tribunal concluded that the offer of proof was insufficient. 6 A 
trial judge of the superior court then dismissed the plaintiff's action 
brought against the doctors who performed the operation and the hospital 
where it was performed for failure to post a bond. 7 In reversing as to the 
doctors who counseled prior to her operation, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found the offer of proof sufficient to vitiate her consent to the operation. 8 
The Court first noted that the fundamental premise underlying all medi-
cal treatment is that "it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, 
to determine ... the direction in which ... his interest lie. "9 The doctrine 
of informed consent has developed to protect the right of a patient to 
make his own inteligent decision whether to undergo a medical or surgical 
procedure. The "knowing exercise ofthis right requires knowledge of the 
§ 11.4. I 387 Mass. 152, 439 N .E.2d 240 (1982). 




6 /d. See G.L. c. 231, § 60B. 
7 387 Mass. at 153, 439 N .E.2d at 241. "If a finding is made for the defendant [by the 
tribunal] the plaintiff may pursue the claim through the usualjudicial process only upon filing 
bond .... " G.L. c. 231, § 60B. 
8 See 387 Mass. at 153, 159, 439 N .E.2d at 242, 245. 
• Id. at 154,439 N.E.2d at 242 (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 11 
(1972». 
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available options and risks attendant on each."io Consequently, the Court 
held "that a physician's failure to divulge in a reasonable manner to a 
competent adult patient sufficient information to enable the patient to 
make an informed judgment whether to give or withhold consent to a 
medical or surgical procedure constitutes professional misconduct and 
comes within the ambit of [chapter 231, section 60B of the General 
Laws]." 11 
In defining the scope of the physician's duty to disclose medical infor-
mation, the Harnish Court recognized both that there are limits to what 
society or an individual can reasonably expect of a physician, and that 
there may be almost no limit to the possible risks of a proposed treatment. 
In order to avoid placing an undue burden upon the physician, the Court 
adopted a rule that balanced the physician's predicament with the pa-
tient's right to know. It declared that "a physician owes to his patient the 
duty to disclose in a reasonable manner all significant medical information 
that the physician possesses or reasonably should possess that is material 
to an intelligent decision by the patient whether to undergo a proposed 
procedure." i2 Information which a physician reasonably should possess 
was further defined as "that information possessed by the average qual-
ified physician or, in the case of a specialty, by the average qualified 
physician practicing that specialty. "i3 Equally important is the Court's 
further statement that the determination of what medical information is 
material to an intelligent decision by the patient is one that lay persons are 
qualified to make without the aid of an expert. i4 What the physician 
should know however, can ordinarily be proved only by expert tes-
timony.is 
The duty to disclose is not absolute. Situations may arise where the 
physician will be privileged to withhold information in the patient's best 
interest,16 This privilege to withhold information must be "carefully cir-
cumscribed," the Court warned, in order to keep it from' '(Ievour[ing] the 
disclosure rule itself."i7 Moreover, "[t]he privilege does not accept the 
paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent simply because 
IO/d. 
11 ld. at 154-55, 439 N.E.2d at 242. 
12 ld. at 155,439 N.E.2d at 243. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. at 156,439 N.E.2d at 243. 
IS ld. 
16 ld. at 156-57, 439 N .E.2d at 243-44. The Court suggested that disclosure might in some 
instances complicate the patient's medical condition or render him unfit for treatment. ld. 
at 157, 439 N .E.2d at 244. 
17 ld. at 157,439 N.E.2d at 244 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. 
Cir), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)). 
8
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divulgence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels 
the patient really needs."18 
As a prerequisite to recovery, the patient must of course show that the 
physician's failure to disclose material medical information is a legal 
cause of the injury sustained. On the question of causation, the Court 
noted that whether the alleged undisclosed risk materialized is a medical 
question appropriate to the malpractice tribunal's inquiry. 19 Whether a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances, if given the proper informa-
tion, would have undergone the medical procedure anyway is not medical 
question, however, and is not, therefore, appropriate to the tribunal's 
inquiry.20 
Finally, the Harnish Court discussed which persons could be held liable 
for the failure to obtain the patient's informed consent. The Court found 
that the hospital could not be held vicariously liable for the alleged 
negligence of the surgeons absent proof that the surgeons were affiliated 
with the hospital and that the hospital had power of control over their 
professional conduct.H Also, a physician who merely assisted in the 
operation could not be held liable for failing to obtain the plaintiff's 
informed consent. 22 The plaintiff's offer of proof in Harnish was held 
sufficient to raise a question appropriate for judicial inquiry not only with 
respect to the physician in charge ofthe operation, but also with regard to 
another physician who assisted at the operation and who had discussed 
the potential consequences of the surgery with the plaintiff but had failed 
to disclose the risk of loss of tongue function. 23 
§ 11.5. Wrongful Death - Causation. In Miles v. Edward O. Tabor, 
M.D., Inc.,1 the defendant doctor's negligence at the birth of the plain-
tiff's son allegedly resulted in the boy's death about two month's later. 2 
Judgment was entered on a verdict for the plaintiff for the wrongful death 
of the boy. 3 On appeal, the defendant admitted the negligence but argued 
there was insufficient evidence of causation. Two causes of death were 
listed on the death certificate: aspiration pneumonia, and a congential 
malformation of the gastrointestinal ("G.1.") tract. 4 Defendant claimed 
18 ld. at 157, 439 N.E.2d at 244. 
19 ld. at 158,439 N.E.2d at 244. 
20 ld. 
21 ld. at 159,439 N.E.2d at 245. 
22 ld. 
23 ld. at 158-59, 439 N.E.2d at 244-45. 
§ 11.5 1 387 Mass. 783, 443 N .E.2d 1302 (1982). Miles is also discussed in section 6 of 
this chapter. 
2 ld. at 784-85, 443 N.E.2d at 1303. 
3 ld. at 784, 443 N.E.2d at 1303. 
4 ld. at 786, 443 N .E.2d at 1304. 
9
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that even if there were evidence that his negligence was causally related to 
the aspiration pneumonia, there was no such evidence as to the other 
cause of death. 5 Therefore, the defendant reasoned there was no way for 
the jury to find that aspiration pneumonia rather than the G.!. tract 
malformation was the cause of death. 6 
The Supreme Judicial Court found defendant's argument flawed be-
cause a death certificate is not conclusive, but only "prima facie evidence 
of the facts recorded."7 In this case, there was ample evidence contradict-
ing the death certificate. This evidence included the testimony of a physi-
cian who examined the baby shortly after its birth. 8 In fact, the birth 
certificate completed by the defendant himself indicated that the plain-
tiff's son did not have any congenital malformations. 9 This conflict be-
tween the death certificate and the birth certificate by itself raised a 
factual issue, and the Court concluded that "[tJhe jury could, therefore, 
disregard the statement on the death certificate that the malformation of 
the G.!. tract was a cause of death. "10 Since the death certificate was 
inconclusive on the issue of causation, the Court found there was 
sufficient evidence before the jury from which it could find that the cause 
of death was aspiration pneumonia and that defendant's inadequate re-
suscitative techniques in the delivery room were causually related to the 
death of plaintiffs' son. 11 Relying upon its earlier pronouncement in 
Woronka v. Sewall, 12 the Court stated: "the 'plaintiff was not required to 
show the exact cause of (the) injuries or to exclude all possibility that they 
resulted without fault on the part of the defendant. It was enough if (he) 
showed that the harm which befell (his son) was more likely due to 
negligence of the defendant than to some other cause for which he was not 
liable.' "13 
§ 11.6. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Miles v. Edward O. 
Tabor, M.D., Inc. 1 involved a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
5/d. 
61d. 
7 Id. See O.L. c. 46, § 19, as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 486, § 13. 
8 387 Mass. at 787, 443 N.E.2d at 1304. 
9/d. 
to /d. Once evidence is introduced contradicting the' prima facie evidence, the prima facie 
evidence need be given "only the weight that ... [it] deservers] in the estimation of the 
jury." Id. at 786, 443 N.E.2d at 1304 (citing Cook v. Farm Servo Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 
564, 569, 17 N.E.2d 890, 893 (1938». 
11 /d. at 787, 443 N.E.2d at 1304-05. 
12 320 Mass. 362, 69 N.E.2d 581 (1964). 
t3 387 Mass. at 787, 443 N.E.2d at 1305 (quoting Woronka V. Sewall, 320 Mass. 362, 365, 
69 N.E.2d 581, 582 (1964». 
§ 11.6. I 387 Mass. 783,443 N .E.2d 1302 (1982). Miles is also discussed in section 5 of 
this chapter. 
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distress upon the plaintiff which she allegedly suffered as a result of 
witnessing a doctor's negligent resuscitation of her newborn son in the 
delivery room. 2 The mother sought to establish her claim through the 
opinion testimony of a psychiatrist that her depression originated with her 
observation ofthe doctor's actions in the delivery room. 3 The psychiatrist 
focused on the mother's grief following her son's death two months after 
the defendant's negligent conduct, however, and did not dispute the fact 
that the mother "experienced no symptoms of emotional distress until 
after [her son's] death. "4 The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a judg-
ment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict because there was 
insufficient evidence to show that the mother experienced her emotional 
distress at the time of the doctor's negligence in the delivery room. s 
Mrs. Miles predicated her claim of emotional distress on Dziokonski v. 
Babineau, 6 a 1978 decision in which the Court abandoned the requirement 
of physical impact as a component of the tort of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 7 The Dziokonski Court held that a parent may recover 
damages for "substantial physical harm sustained as a result of severe 
mental distress over some peril or harm to his minor child caused by the 
defendant's negligence .... "8 The Dziokonski mother actually died from 
shock when she saw her child in the street immediately after a motor 
vehicle accident. Dziokonski left open the question whether the child's 
father could recover for his emotional distress where there was a time 
lapse between that accident and the father's knowledge of the death of his 
wife and the injuries to his son. This question was partially answered in 
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell & Sons, Inc.,9 where the Court held that 
severe mental distress is a reasonably foreseeable COIl sequence of the 
defendant's negligence if such anguish "follows closely on the heels ofthe 
accident." 10 It appears that Miles has answered the question at the other 
extreme where the distress is long delayed. 
In Miles, all the evidence of emotional distress experienced by the 
mother related to the period after her son's death rather than to the time of 
the defendant's negligence in the delivery room two months earlier. Thus, 
there was insufficient evidence that the mother suffered any emotional 
distress at the time of her son's birth which was distinct from her claim for 
2 Jd. at 784-85, 443 N.E.2d at 1303. 
3 /d. at 789, 443 N.E.2d at 1305-06. 
4 Jd. at 789, 443 N.E.2d at 1305. 
5 /d. at 784, 789, 443 N.E.2d at 1303, 1305-06. 
6 375 Mass. 555, 380 N .E.2d 1295 (1978). 
7 Jd. at 556, 380 N.E.2d at 1296. 
8 /d. at 568, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. 
9 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980). 
10 /d. at 518, 413 N.E.2d at 697. 
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his wrongful death. The Court distinguished Cimino v. Milford Keg, 
Inc., 11 in which it held that a claim for emotional distress of a parent could 
be distinct from the action for the wrongful death of a child. In Cimino a 
father suffered both physical injuries and emotional distress in the same 
accident that killed his son. The emotional distress occurred at the time of 
the defendant's negligence. "There was no delayed response to the 
child's death. "12 The court also noted that the mother in Miles, unlike the 
father in Cimino, "suffered no direct injury from the defendant's n~gli­
gent treatment" of her son}3 
In another case, Payton v. Abbott Labs,t4 the Court finally addressed 
the specific issue of whether emotional injury unaccompanied by physical 
injury should be compensable. This issue was left unresolved by the 
Dziokonski Court, which indeed had emphasized the requirement of 
"substantial phsyical harm. "15 The questions in Payton were presented 
to the Supreme Judicial Court on certification from the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts in the context of a motion 
to dismiss}6 These questions were based upon the plaintiffs' allegations 
that the defendants were negligent in marketing the drug diethylstilbestrol 
("DES") as a miscarriage preventative without adequate testing and 
appropriate warning. I? 
The certified question concerning recovery for emotional distress read 
as follows: "Does Massachusetts recognize a right of action for emotional 
distress and anxiety caused by the negligence of a defendant, in the 
absence of any evidence of physical harm, where such emotional stress 
and anxiety are the result of an increased statistical likelihood [that] the 
plaintiff will suffer serious disease in the future?" 18 The question assumed 
both that defendants were negligent, and that their negligence caused the 
plaintiffs' emotional distress. The Supreme Judicial Court returned a 
negative answer to this question}9 
The Court first noted that jurisdictions allowing recovery for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress without proof of physical harm are 
clearly in the minority. 20 Three policy reasons were given for adhering to 
II 385 Mass. 323,431 N .E.2d 920 (1982). Cimino is discussed in section I ofthis chapter. 
12 387 Mass. at 789 n.8, 443 N.E.2d at 1306 n.8. 
t3 ld. 
14 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). Payton is also discussed in section 7 of this 
chapter. 
15 375 Mass. 555, 568, 380, N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978). 
16 386 Mass. at 541-42, 437 N.E.2d at 173. 
17 This was a class action by plaintiffs who alleged that they faced an increased risk of 
serious disease as a result of exposure in utero to DES, but who had not as of yet developed 
such serious disease. ld. at 540 n.I, 437 N.E.2d at 171 n.l. 
\8 ld. at 544, 437 N.E.2d at 174. 
191d. 
2°ld. at 546, 437 N.E.2d at 175. 
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the physical harm requirement: (1) emotional disturbance which is not so 
serious as to have physical consequences is likely to be .. so temporary, so 
evanescent and so relatively harmless" that the task of compensating for 
it would unduly burden defendants and the court; (2) in the absence of the 
guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting bodily harm, such emo-
tional disturbance can be too easily feigned or imagined; and (3) where the 
defendant's conduct has been merely negligent, without intent to harm, 
his fault is not so great that he should be required to compensate the 
plaintiff for a purely mental disturbance. 21 The Court then reviewed the 
common law history of the attempts to formulate a rule which would allow 
recovery for plaintiffs with clearly recognizable serious emotional in-
juries, while weeding out trivial or feigned claims. Massachusetts first 
followed the impact rule, which limited recovery for emotional distress to 
cases where a defendant's negligence caused a physical impact of some 
kind to plaintiff's person. 22 The meaning of "impact" was eventually 
stretched to allow recovery in other cases and, in 1971, the Court essen-
tially adopted Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,23 and 
allowed recovery for the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress 
"with bodily harm resulting from such distress."24 Five years later, the 
Court acknowledged recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress without resulting bodily injury. 25 Thus, in lieu of impact, the 
element of the defendant's intention, or of the recklessness of his con-
duct, became the additional requirement necessary for satisfactory proof. 
The parasitic recovery cases, which require physical injury to accom-
pany the alleged emotional distress, represent an attempt to find an 
element of satisfactory proof. 26 In these cases, that element is defined as a 
contemporaneously inflicted physical injury,27 More recently, plaintiffs 
have met the requirement of satisfactory proof absent impact if they were 
within the "zone of danger" created by defendant's negligence, even 
though they did not suffer physical injuries. 28 In 1978, the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered the need for satisfactory proof in these cases, 
and held that recovery by a bystander plaintiff would be allowed, regard-
less of whether the plaintiff was within the" zone of danger," if there was 
both proof of "substantial physical injury and proof that the injury was 
caused by the defendant's negligence. "29 
21 Id. at 553, 437 N .E.2d at 180. 
22 See Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 41 N.E. 88 (1897). 
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1%5). Section 46 acknowledges the existence 
of the tort of "outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress." 
24 See George v. Jordon Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 255, 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1971). 
25 See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). 
26 See 386 Mass. at 548, 437 N.E.2d at 176. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. at 554, 437 N.E.2d at .177. 
29 Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978). 
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After reviewing the various approaches used in negligent infliction of 
emotional distress cases, including its own prior pronouncements on this 
issue, the Payton Court concluded that for negligently inflicted emotional 
distress, a plaintiff must allege and prove she suffered physical harm that 
was either the cause, or was caused by, the alleged emotional distress. 3o 
Furthermore, the Court stressed that to be compensable, the emotional 
distress allegedly suffered by the plaintiff must be reasonably foreseeable 
and no more than the which "a reasonable person, normally constituted, 
would have experienced under [similar] circumstances. "31 Thus, follow-
ing Payton, in order to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress, 
a plaintiff must prove: (1) negligence; (2) emotional distress; (3) causa-
tion; (4) physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology; and (5) 
that a reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress under the 
circumstances of the case. 
§ 11.7. DES Issues - Wrongful Life - Injury In Utero. In Payton v. 
Abbott Labs 1 the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts certified several questions to the Supreme Judicial Court to 
determine whether Massachusetts law would allow tort recovery by 
women whose mothers ingested the drug diethylstilbestrol ("DES") as a 
preventative of miscarriages. The Court's response to the second of these 
questions2 was that there can be no tort recovery by a women who 
"would probably not have been born except for the mother's ingestion of 
DES. "3 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court found neither the wrong-
fullife nor the Good Samaritan analogies compelling on the facts before it. 
With respect to the former theory, the Court noted that other jurisdictions 
have "almost invariably denied recovery" because "life is more precious 
than non-life. "4 Also, the Court observed, the judiciary is incapable of 
assessing "the relative monetary values of existence and nonexistence. "5 
30 386 Mass. at 556, 437 N .E.2d at 180. 
3I Id. at 557, 437 N.E.2d at 180. The Payton Court felt that emotional distress is rea-
sonably foreseeable "when there is a causal relationship between the physical injuries 
suffered and the emotional distress alleged." Id. at 556, 437 N .E.2d at 180. 
§ 11.7. I Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). Payton is also 
discussed in section 6 of this chapter. 
2 The Court's response to the first certified question is discussed in section 6 of this 
chapter. 
3 386 Mass. at 557,437 N .E.2d at 181. This defense may not be as significant in fact as it is 
in theory because the burden of proof in this issue is upon the drug manufacturer and 
medical records on testimony from a prior generation may not be readily available. 
4 ld. at 558, 437 N.E.2d at 181 (quoting Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 429, 404 A.2d 8,13 
(1979)). 
5 386 Mass. at 558, 437 N.E.2d at 181. 
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The Court found that the Good Samaritan decisions were not on point 
because the complainants in the case sub judice were not placed in a worse 
position, but in fact were the very persons rescued. 6 Moreover, the Court 
stated "if the only alternative to the defendants' 'rescue' is that the 
plaintiff would not have been born, we cannot perceive how the plaintiffs 
would have been better off if the defendants had not acted. "7 
While the "wrongful life" cases were not directly on point in Payton, 
the Court did find them persuasive in some respects. Relying on their 
rationale, the Court held that, "if the trier of fact finds that a preponder-
ance of the credible evidence supports the conclusion that a particular 
plaintiff would not have been born except for her mother's ingestion of 
DES, the plaintiff is barred from recovery. "8 This ruling places the 
burden of proof on the defendants who are required to show that: "(1) the 
mothers of the plaintiffs would have suffered, in each instance, a miscar-
riage absent medical intervention; (2) no other means, method or sub-
stance was available to prevent a miscarriage; and (3) DES did, in fact, 
prevent the miscarriage and cause the plaintiffs to be born. "9 "The 
provider of the probable means of a plaintiff's very existence should not 
be liable for unavoidable collateral consequences of the use of that 
means."IO 
The Court answered another certified question affirmatively by recog-
nizing a right of action for injury to a plaintiff in utero resulting from the 
ingestion of a drug by her mother. lIThe court made three assumptions in 
answering the questions: "(a) the plaintiffs have suffered injuries which 
are legally compensable if wrongfully inflicted; (b) the defendants' con-
duct was negligent; and (c) the defendants' conduct was the cause of the 
plaintiffs injuries. "12 No reason was found to distinguish the present case, 
in which the plaintiff's mother ingested the drug, from the case in which 
plaintiffs themselves ingest a drug and directly suffer injury as a result. 13 
§ 11.S. Malicious Prosecution - Abuse of Process. Two cases during the 
Survey year discussed the nature of an attorney's liability for malicious 
prosecution and for abuse of process. In the first of these cases, Beecy v. 
Pucciarelli,! the plaintiffs brought an action against an attorney for 
malicious prosecution and for abuse of process based on the attorney's 
6 /d. at 559, 437 N.E.2d at 182. 
7 /d. 
8 /d. at 559, 437 N .E.2d at 182. 
9 /d. at 560, 437 N.E.2d at 182. 
IO/d. 
11/d. 
12 Jd. at 562, 437 N.E.2d at 184. 
13 /d. 
§ 11.8. 1 387 Mass. 589, 441 N.E.2d 1035 (1982). 
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erroneous institution of a collection action on behalf of his client, a 
department store, against two of the store's charge account customers. 
The husband and wife plaintiffs unfortunately had the same name as a 
delinquent charge account customer.2 The Supreme Judicial Court ap-
proved a Rule 12(b )(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.3 
In the 1835 decision of Bicknell v. Dorion 4 the Supreme Judicial Court 
established the limitations on malicious prosecution actions against attor-
neys, concluding that such actions could not be brought "unless the 
attorney commenced the suit without the authority of the named plaintiff 
or unless the attorney and the named plaintiff had conspired or otherwise 
knowingly agreed to commence a groundless lawsuit. "5 Although the 
Court in Beecy noted that "there are compelling reasons for abolishing" 
the Bicknell immunity limitations, it did not feel compelled to do so 
because the plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite elements to establish 
their cause of action.6 The tort of malicious prosecution requires the 
institution or continuation of a proceeding, with malice and without prob-
able cause, as well as the termination of the proceeding in favor of the 
accused. The plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing malice.7 In a proper 
case the existence of malice may be inferred from the lack of probable 
cause. 8 The Court refused to do so in Beecy because the facts belied any 
malice on the part of the attorney. A person with a name identical to the 
plaintiffs did have a delinquent account with the defendant department 
store, and when the defendant attorney realized this mistake he promptly 
filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the collection action and sent a 
letter of apology to the plaintiffs. 9 Although the attorney failed to instruct 
the sheritf not to serve the summonses and complaints on the plaintiffs, 
his failure to do so was not maliciously intended. to 
In Carrol v. Gillespie,l1 the other malicious prosecution and abuse of 
2 ld. at 591-92, 441 N.E.2d at 1037. 
3 ld. at 590-91, 441 N.E.2d at 1037. 
4 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 478 (1835). 
5 See 387 Mass. at 593, ¥1 N.E.2d at 1038 (citing Bicknell v. Dorion, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 
478, 490 (1835». 
61d. 
7 Specifically, the plaintiffs in Beecy failed to show that the attorney (1) knew that there 
was no probable cause for the prosecution and (2) either personally acted with an improper 
motion or knew that his client was motivated by malice. 387 Mass. at 593, 441 N.E.2d at 
1038-39. See Wills v. Noyes, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 324, 328, (1832); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 674 comment d (1977». 
8 See 387 Mass. at 594, 441 N .E.2d at 1038-39. See also Seelig v. Harvard Coop. Soc., 355 
Mass. 532,537,246 N.E.2d 642, 646-47 (1969). 
9 387 Mass. at 594-95, 441 N.E.2d at 1039. 
10 ld. at 595, 441 N.E.2d at 1039. 
IJ 14 Mass. App. Ct. 12,436 N.E.2d 431 (1982). 
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process case decided during the Survey year, the Appeals Court upheld a 
jury verdict for the plaintiff where the defendant had the plaintiff arrested 
for forging an endorsement on a check. The facts made it clear that the 
defendant did not have probable cause to believe that it was the plaintiff 
who had endorsed the check. There was also evidence that the defendant 
caused the arrest in order to coerce the plaintiff into paying a debt,12 
On review, the court stressed the probable cause issue. Noting that 
probable cause is an objective standard, the court chose to follow the 
Restatement definition that "the defendant has probable cause only when 
a reasonable man in his position would believe, and the defendant does in 
fact believe, that he has sufficient information as to both the facts and the 
applicable law to justify him in initiating the criminal proceeding without 
further investigation or verification." 13 The defendant was unable to 
measure up to this standard. When he went to the police and charged the 
plaintiff with forgery the defendant was clearly aware of the following 
facts: "the check was not endorsed when the defendant's company origi-
nally received it; that it had previously been returned by the bank for that 
reason; it was then redeposited by the dealership with a signature on the 
back; plaintiff had sworn in an affidavit that she did not sign the check; 
and her signature had, in fact, been forged. "14 Also, the defendant admit-
ted at trial he had no personal knowledge whether the plaintiff had signed 
the check. IS The court therefore concluded that the defendant recklessly 
made categorical statements to an officer accusing the plaintiff of forgery 
based on ambiguous and superficial information, and that those state-
ments resulted in the plaintiff's arrest. 16 
Both Beecy and Carroll also contained abuse of process counts. "To 
prevail on a cause of action for abuse of process 'it must appear that the 
process was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was 
not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the 
particular process employed.' "17 In Beecy the claim failed because there 
was no allegation that the attorney or his department store client used the 
collection action process for any purpose other than debt collection. IS 
"[M]ere commencement of litigation to enforce a claim which the person 
12 ld. at 26, 436 N.E.2d at 439. 
13 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 129, 436 N.E.2d at 437 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 662 comment j (1977». 
14 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 22, 436 N.E.2d at 437-38. 
IS /d. at 22, 436 N.E.2d at 437. 
16 /d. at 25-26, 436 N.E.2d at 438-39. 
17 387 Mass. at 595, 441 N.E.2d at 1039-40 (quoting Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 
423,426, 187 N.E.2d 859,861-62 (1963), quoting Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 236, 85 
N.E.2d 435, 439-40 (1949». 
18 /d. at 595-96, 441 N.E.2d at 1039-40. 
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commencing the litigation knows or reasonably should have known to be 
groundless [does not] constitute legal abuse of process without proof of 
ulterior purpose."19 In Carrol, however, the plaintiff was successful 
because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that 
the defendant caused the plaintiff's arrest because he wanted to collect a 
debt and thus sought to use the criminal process for a civil purpose. 20 
§ 11.9. Torts Claims Act - Public Duty Doctrine. In Dinsky v. Framing-
ham 1 the Supreme Judicial Court handed down a decision which may 
drastically circumscribe public liability for negligent performance of pub-
lic functions despite the 1978 enactment of the Massachusetts Torts 
Claims Act.2 In this case of first impression, the Court applied the public 
duty doctrine, which states that public employees are not liable for negli-
gent performance of purely public duties.) 
InDinsky, the town's department of health issued a building permit for 
the construction of a one family residence on the "condition that the lots 
shall be graded as to prevent low spots that will not drain and create a 
public nuisance."4 The town later issued an occupancy permit despite 
the fact that the requirements expressed in the condition were not met. S 
More than two years later, the property flooded to a depth exceeding one 
inch in the house.6 The garage, driveway and large portions of the lawn 
were also flooded. 7 As a result large cracks developed in the walls of the 
foundation. 8 
The plaintiffs, who were residents of the affected property, sued the 
municipality for damages under the tort claims act.9 A directed verdict for 
the city was upheld on appeal. 10 The Supreme Judicial Court concluded 
that the abrogation of the doctrine of governmental immunity by the act 
did not create any new theory of liability, but simply removed the defense 
of immunity in certain tort actions against the Commonwealth, munici-
palities and other governmental units. 11 The plaintiffs "were not entitled 
19Id. at 596, 441 N.E.2d at 1039-40. 
20 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 26, 436 N.E.2d at 439. 
§ 11.9 I 386 Mass. 801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982). 
2 G.L. c. 258, §§ 1-13. 
) See Glannon, Scope of Public Liability Under The Torts Claims Act: Beyond the Public 
Duty Rule. 67 MASS. L. REV. 159 (1982). 





9 See id. at 802-03, 438 N.E.2d at 52. 
10 Id. at 802, 438 N.E.2d at 51. 
II Dinsky. 386 Mass. at 804, 438 N.E.2d at 54. 
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to recover against the town because the town did not violate a duty owed 
to them as individuals." 12 The building codes were found to "confer no 
specific duties upon building commissioners or inspectors with regard to 
individual citizens and property owners. 13 
It is not at all clear that Dinsky is intended to adopt a broad public duty 
doctrine. The Court was careful in its opinion to cite only negligent 
inspection cases. It's failure to rely upon other types of public duty cases 
may indicate a recognition of the incompatibility of that doctrine with the 
Legislature's admonition to construe the tort claims act "liberally" in 
order to accomplish its intended purpose to substitute governmentalliabil-
ity for governmental immunity.14 
12 /d. 
i3 Dinsky, 386 Mass. at 809, 438 N.E.2d at 55-56. 
14 See Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 18; see also Glannon, supra note 3, at 160. 
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